Until Lenin’s death in 1924, philosophy in the Soviet Union was pluralistic, with battling factions —dialecticians, mechanicists, even orthodox Christians— hoping to win out over one another by force of persuasion. By the 1930s, the sundry sects encouraged by Lenin had been denounced by Stalin as so much “menshevizing idealism,” and certain, carefully selected, easily comprehensible, and empirically unfalsifiable fragments of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, in particular segments of the Dialektik der Natur, were enshrined as a form of state religion. Between 1925 and 1928, Stalin did his very best to learn the basics of dialectical materialism, as understood by his forebears, and even of the Hegelian idealist dialectics that had been ‘stood on its head’ by his Marxist successors, while nonetheless, true to the spirt of Aufhebung, in a certain respect preserved. Stalin even retained the services of a tutor, I. E. Spet, to teach him the basics of Hegel’s philosophy, but in the end, discouraged by its abstruseness, dispatched his court philosopher to Siberia. Stalin’s confusion concerning the true character of dialectical philosophy led to no small confusion among the logicians active in Stalin’s USSR. In particular, there was a great deal of uncertainty concerning the law of the excluded middle and its dispensability. On Stalin’s rough understanding of dialectical logic, prima facie contradictions resolve themselves in higher order syntheses, and the old Aristotelian devotion to bivalence in logic seemed for that reason regressively undialectical. Lukasiewicz and his Soviet successors such as Bochvar, then, were seen in the 1930s to be, as it were, dialectically correct. By the 1940s, however, polyvalence would be ferociously denounced by A. A. Zhdanov, Stalin’s culture minister, as a tool of quantum mechanics, itself a mere expression of bourgeois subjective idealism. In this paper, I sketch out the fate of non-classical logic, in particular the polyvalent logic of Lukasiewicz, in the Soviet Union under Stalin. I maintain that the history of the reception of non-classical logic is instructive in any effort to discern the ever-changing, and ever more crude, understanding of the dialectical tradition in officially sanctioned Soviet philosophy.