There is a piece today in 'The Stone' that motivates me to repeat, yet again, my position on the cluster of issues surrounding Eurocentrism in academic philosophy. This position is developed much more extensively in chapter 2 of my book The Philosopher: A History in Six Types, and will be developed more extensively still in A Global History of Philosophy, to 1750 (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
I agree entirely with Garfield and Van Norden. Academic philosophy at present is de facto a branch of Euro-American Studies. One complicating factor the authors do not address however is that in many cases there has been a long and contentious history surrounding the question whether the category of 'philosophy' is one that representatives of non-European intellectual traditions would even want, or would have wanted, to adopt as a description of what they are doing, or whether rather describing these traditions as philosophy does not already force them into a mould they did not grow up originally to fit.
(Investigation of this sort of question is significantly more advanced in history-of-science scholarship than it is among academic philosophers. Historians of science have long been engaged in serious reflection about what it means, for example, to say that science did or did not exist in Mesopotamia or in Pharaonic Egypt. They don't just assume at the outset that we know what science is and we can immediately recognise all occurrences of it.)
Some have argued, for example, that considerable violence had to be done to Chinese intellectual traditions in order to shape them into something recognisable on the 'world market' as philosophy (for example, they had to be divorced from what we can only identify, in a trivialising manner, as 'calligraphy'), that this only happened as a result of the pressures of nationalist modernisation campaigns late in the 19th century, and that the result was a mere fossil specimen, easily teachable in new western-modelled curricula, but only because it was by now no longer alive. See for example Anne Cheng, "Y-a-t-il une philosophie chinoise? : est-ce une bonne question?" in Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident 27 (2005). This sort of concern, about what exactly it means to belong to a culture that can claim to have its own philosophy, and how this meaning has changed over time as a result of broader historical processes that for the most part do not play out on the plane of ideas, is one to which, for better or worse, academic philosophers interested in promoting diversity will also need to turn their attention. The resistance to doing so exposes yet another deep bias, which is not only harmful to the dead people it ignores: the bias of presentism.
Today all right-thinking people believe it's good to recognise and to value every culture's 'philosophy'. Why? How did it come to this? What are some alternative approaches to conceptualising global connected intellectual history (to adapt the name of a subdiscipline pioneered by Sanjay Subrahmanyam; see for example his Explorations in Connected History: Mughals and Franks of 2004)? How might these alternatives be more adequate to the study of the diversity of the world's intellectual traditions? Etc.